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Abstract. Scenarios are a popular means for capturing behavioural requirements
of software systems early in the lifecycle. Scenarios show how components in-
teract to provide system level functionality. If component reliability information
is available, scenarios can be used to perform early system reliability assessment.
In this paper we present a novel automated approach for predicting software sys-
tem reliability. The approach involves extending a scenario speciﬁcation to model
(1) the probability of component failure, and (2) scenario transition probabilities
derived from an operational proﬁle of the system. From the extended scenario
speciﬁcation, probabilistic behaviour models are synthesized for each compo-
nent and are then composed in parallel into a model for the system. Finally, a
user-oriented reliability model described by Cheung is used to compute a relia-
bility prediction from the system behaviour model. The contribution of this paper
is a reliability prediction technique that takes into account the component struc-
ture exhibited in the scenarios and the concurrent nature of component-based
systems. We also show how implied scenarios induced by the component struc-
ture and system behaviour described in the scenarios can be used to evolve the
reliability prediction.
1 Introduction
Software reliability engineering is an important aspect of many system development
efforts, and consequently there has been a great deal of research in this area [15,10].
One important activity included in software reliability engineering is reliability pre-
diction [11]. There has been much recent work in reliability engineering that has ad-
dressed reliability modeling and prediction of architecture- and component-based soft-
ware [8,19]. Components both simplify and complicate reliability prediction. They sim-
plify because accurate component reliability estimates may be available to aid reliabil-
ity prediction early in the development lifecycle. They complicate due to the need for
a sound compositional approach to reliability prediction. A promising compositional
approach to predicting reliability of component-based systems early in the lifecycle is
to base the prediction on scenarios of system usage.Scenarios have been widely adopted as a way to capture system behavioral require-
ments. Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [9] and their UML counterpart, Sequence
Diagrams (SDs) [16] are widely accepted notations for scenario-based speciﬁcation.
There has been some previous work on using scenarios to predict the reliability of
component-based software [4,27], but they use imprecise, coarse-grained, sequential
models of system architecture as the basis for prediction. In this paper, we present a
novel scenario-based approach to reliability prediction in which a more precise, ﬁne-
grained, concurrent system architecture model is synthesised for computing a reliability
prediction. The approach starts with a set of scenarios and a high-level message se-
quence chart (HMSC). The HMSC is annotated with scenario transition probabilities
derived from an operational proﬁle of the system [14], which accounts for the relative
frequency with which system usage results in a transition from one scenario to another.
We synthesise from the scenarios a deterministic probabilitistic behaviour model for
each system component. Each component model is then extended to model the proba-
bility of component failure. The resulting probabilistic models are composed in parallel
andusedtopredictthereliabilityofthecomponent-basedsystemaccordingtoCheung’s
user-oriented reliability model [3].
The contribution of this paper is a reliability prediction technique that takes into
account the component structure exhibited in the scenarios and the concurrent nature of
component-based systems. We also show how as a result of this implied scenarios can
impact the result of reliability analysis.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we brieﬂy present some back-
ground information about the different elements of our approach. In Section 3 we de-
scribe in detail our scenario-based method for predicting software system reliability
and an extensive illustration of our approach. In Section 4 we show how implied sce-
narios detection can be used to improve reliability prediction for concurrent software
systems. In Section 5 we compare our approach to other efforts for analysing reliability
of component-based software and discuss the main differences between our approach
and other scenario-based reliability analysis models. Finally, in Section 6 we present
our conclusions and discuss several future directions for our work.
2 Background
In this section we brieﬂy review the two main concepts on which we base our method
for predicting the reliability of component-based software: scenario speciﬁcations, and
Cheung’s user-oriented software reliability model. Note that we adopt Szyperski’s deﬁ-
nition of component as a unit of independent development and deployment. We further
viewcomponentsasbeinglarge-grainedsystementities(asopposedtosmall-scalecom-
ponents such as GUI widgets) for which one may reasonably expect to have reliability
data, which in turn can be established through reliability testing [6].
2.1 Scenarios
Scenario notations such as Message Sequence Charts [9] are used at early stages of
development to document, elicit and describe system behaviour. Scenarios are partialdescriptions of how components interact to provide system level functionality. A sce-
nario speciﬁcation is formed by composing multiple scenarios possibly from different
stakeholders.
The underlying notion of scenario composition is that simple scenarios can be used
as building blocks to describe new, more complex, scenarios. Simple sequences of be-
havior are described using Basic Message Sequence Charts (BMSCs). A BMSC is
formed by vertical lines representing component time lines and horizontal arrows rep-
resenting interactions between components. In this paper, we interpret each interaction
as a synchronous communication between components. Because a BMSC can represent
concurrent activity among the components it portrays, it denotes a partial ordering of
activities, which in turn under an interleaving semantics determines a corresponding set
of ﬁnite sequences of interactions.
ThreefundamentalconstructsforcombiningBMSCsareverticalcomposition(where
two BMSCs can be combined sequentially), alternative composition (deﬁning that the
system could alternatively choose one of the BMSCs to follow) and iterative composi-
tion (which composes a BMSC sequentially with itself). The high-level MSC (HMSC)
is a widely adopted syntactic construct for describing scenario composition. An HMSC
is a directed graph, whose nodes refer to BMSCs and whose edges indicate the accept-
able ordering of the BMSCs. HMSCs allow stakeholders to reuse scenarios within a
speciﬁcation and to introduce sequences, loops and alternatives of BMSCs. The seman-
tics of an HMSC is the set of sequences of interactions that follow some maximal path
through the HMSC.
Throughout this paper we use a variant of the Boiler Control system example pre-
sented by Uchitel et al. [25]. As shown in Figure 1, the Boiler Control system consists
of four components: Sensor, Control, Database and Actuator. In the top portion of the
ﬁgure, we depict the HMSC speciﬁcation of the Boiler, which composes ﬁve BMSCs:
Initialise, Register, Analyse, Terminate and End, which are depicted in Figure 1, ex-
cluding the upper-left corner where the HMSC is. Note that the variables appearing in
curly brackets in the ﬁgure are an extension to MSCs that we explain in Section 3.
2.2 The Cheung User-Oriented Reliability Model
In order to predict software system reliability, we need a reliability model that expresses
system reliability as a function of the reliability of the components and the frequency
of utilization of those components. Using Cheung’s approach [3], the reliability of the
system can be computed as a function of both the deterministic properties of the struc-
ture of the program and the stochastic properties of the utilisation and failure of its
components.
Essentially, the Cheung model is a Markov reliability model that uses a program
ﬂow graph to represent the structure of the system. Every node Ni in the ﬂow graph
of the Cheung model represents a program module and a direct branch (Ni,Nj) rep-
resents a possible transfer of control from Ni to Nj. A probability Pij that transition
(Ni,Nj) will happen is attached to every directed branch. Ri is the reliability of node
Ni. The original transition (Ni,Nj) in the ﬂow graph is then modiﬁed into RiPij,
which represents the probability that the execution of module Ni produces the correctInitialise
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Fig.1. The Message Sequence Chart Speciﬁcation for the Boiler Control System, with
Example Probability Values.
result and control is transferred to module Nj. The reliability of the program is, there-
fore, the probability of reaching the correct termination of the program ﬂow graph from
its initial state in the following way: Let N = {C,F,N1,N2,...,Nn} be the states of
the model, where N1 is the start state of the program control ﬂow graph, the Ni are
intermediate states, Nn is the last (non-absorbing) state reached in any successful exe-
cution of the system, and C and F are absorbing states representing the terminal states
Correct (to which there is a transition from Nn) and Fault. Let the transition matrix be
M0 where M0
ij represents the probability of transition from state i to state j:
M
0 =
C F N1 N2 ... Nn
C
F
N1
N2
. . .
Nn

 


1 0 0 0 ... 0
0 1 0 0 ... 0
0 1 − R1 0 R1P12 ... R1P1n
0 1 − R2 0 R2P22 ... R2P2n
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
Rn 1 − Rn 0 0 ... 0

 


Let M be the matrix obtained from M0 by deleting the rows and columns corresponding
to the absorbing states C and F. Let S be a matrix such that:
S = I + M + M2 + M3 + ....... =
∞ X
k=0
Mk = (I − M)−1
whereI istheidentitymatrixwithsamedimensionofM.Cheungshowsthatthesystem
reliability is Rel= S(1,n) × Rn, which is the probability of successfully transitioningfrom N1 to Nn in any execution times the probability of successfully reaching C from
Nn. Equivalently, Cheung shows that S(1,n) can be computed as
S(1,n) = (−1)n+1 |M|
|I − M|
(1)
where |M| and |I − M| represent the determinant of M and I − M, respectively. We
refer the reader to Cheung [3] for further details on the description and derivation of
these formulae.
In the next section, we show how we weave the concepts presented in this section
into a method for predicting the reliability of component-based software.
3 Reliability Analysis Using Scenarios
In this section we describe a method to predict software system reliability as a function
of component reliability estimates. We annotate a scenario speciﬁcation with proba-
bilistic properties and use a probabilistic labelled transition system (LTS) synthesised
from the scenario speciﬁcation for the software reliability prediction. The method is
depicted in Figure 2 as ﬁve major steps: (1) annotation of the scenarios, (2) synthesis
of the probabilistic LTS, (3) construction of the stochastic matrix, (4) system reliability
prediction, and (5) implied scenario detection.
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Fig.2. The Reliability Prediction Method.
Four key assumptions underlie our method:
1. The transfer of control between components has the Markov property, meaning that
the transition from one execution state to another is dependent only on the source
state and its available transitions and not on the past history of state transitions.
This is a traditional assumption that simpliﬁes in work on reliability analysis and it
greatly simpliﬁes the computation of reliability estimates.
2. Failures are independent across transitions. Again, this assumption simpliﬁes the
computation of reliability estimates.
3. A message from component C to component C0 represents an invocation by C
of a service offered by C0. The reliability with which this service is performed is
thus the reliability of C0, RC0. Additionally, the execution time of the invocation
is assumed to be so short as not to be a factor in the component’s reliability. Inother words, RC0 is the probability of successful completion of an invocation of
any service offered by C0, irrespective of the execution time of the service. This
assumption is simply a modeling choice that is made without loss of generality. For
instance, we could just as easily accommodate method-level reliabilities, and/or
communication reliabilities (as is done, for instance, in Yacoub et.al [27])
4. There is only one initial and one ﬁnal scenario for the system in the HMSC. Mul-
tiple initial and ﬁnal scenarios can be combined by introducing a super-initial and
a super-ﬁnal scenario, analogously to the super-initial state and super-ﬁnal state
proposed by Wang et al. [26].
3.1 The Annotated Scenarios
In the ﬁrst step, we annotate the scenarios ( i.e., the HMSC and BMSCs) with two
kinds of probabilities, the probability of transitions between scenarios PTSij and the
reliability of the components RC.
The transition probability PTSij is the probability that execution control transfers
directly from scenario Si to scenario Sj. This information would be normally derived
from an operational proﬁle for the system [14]. Thus, from scenario Si, the sum of the
probabilities PTSij for all successor scenarios Sj is equal to one. As the PTSij relates
to the transition between scenarios, these probabilities are annotated on the correspond-
ing edges of the HMSC, as shown on the HMSC of Figure 1.
The component reliabilities RC are annotated on the BMSCs, as also shown in Fig-
ure 1. Without loss of generality, this paper uses coarse-grained, single values for the
overall component reliabilities; in general, we could associate reliabilities with individ-
ual messages and/or segments of component timelines.
For the purposes of illustrating our method on the Boiler example, we use the values
depicted in Figure 1 for the PTSij. The values for the PTSij are based on the assump-
tion that the system executes the scenario Register (which causes sensor readings to be
entered into the database) far more frequently than the scenarios Analyse and Terminate,
and that when it does execute Terminate there is an equal probability of reinitialising
and shutting down.
The values on Figure 1 for the reliability of the components reﬂect the assumption
that the Database is a highly reliable commercial software product, that the Sensor and
Actuator are components whose hardware interface to the sensed/actuated phenomena
will eventually fail, and that Control is a complex software subsystem that still contains
latent faults.
3.2 Synthesis of the Probabilistic LTS
The second step of our method is to synthesise a probabilistic LTS from the annotated
scenario speciﬁcation. This step is an extension of the synthesis approach of Uchitel et
al. [24], which consists of the following steps:
1. For each component Ci and each BMSC Sj, a labelled transition system (LTS)
Ci Sj is constructed by projecting the local behaviour of Ci within Sj. In partic-
ular, each message with an action a that Ci sends or receives in Sj is synthesisedas a transition with action a in Ci Sj, and the sequence of transitions in Ci Sj
corresponds with the sequence of messages sent or received by Ci in Sj.
2. For each component Ci, the set of LTSs constructed for Ci in step 1 are composed
into a component LTS for Ci according to the structure of the HMSC, with hidden
transitions (τ actions) linking the ﬁnal state of Ci Sj to the start state of Ci Sj0
whenever there is a transition from Sj to Sj0 in the HMSC. The resulting LTS
includes a new start state corresponding to the start state of the HMSC.
3. Each component LTS constructed in step 2 is reduced to a trace-equivalent deter-
ministic, minimal LTS. This is consistent with the delayed choice semantics of the
ITU MSC standard [9].
4. The architecture model for the system is taken as the parallel composition of the
minimised component LTSs constructed in step 3.
Our extension of this approach exploits recent probabilistic extensions to the LTS
formalism [2] and involves enhancements to each step listed above. The enhancements
have the effect of mapping the probability annotations of the scenario speciﬁcation into
probability weights for transitions in the synthesised architecture model. In step 1, for
each transition in a Ci Sj representing the invocation of a service offered by Ci, an
additional transition from the same source state is added with the target state being the
global ERROR state. The resulting pair of transitions forms a probabilistic choice, with
the former transition having probability RCi and the latter transition having probability
1 − RCi.
In step 2, the scenario transition probabilities PTSij are mapped to probability
weights on the hidden transitions linking the Ci Sj. Figure 3 illustrates the LTS of
component Control that would be synthesised as a result of applying steps 1 and 2 of
our synthesis method. Each shaded area contains an LTS synthesised in step 1 from
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Fig.3. Probabilistic LTS Synthesised for Component Control.
a BMSC of Figure 1 and thus models the behaviour of Control within that BMSC.
The transitions linking these different LTS are synthesised in step 2 and correspond
to the transitions between BMSCs deﬁned in the HMSC of Figure 1. Note that the
probability weights on the τ transitions are the same as the corresponding transitions in
the HMSC of Figure 1. Note also that because data is a message received by Control in
scenario Analyse, it is synthesised as two transitions, the “successful” transition beingweighted with probability Rctrl and the transition to the ERROR state (labelled −1
in the ﬁgure) being weighted with probability 1 − Rctrl. This action only applies to
transitions labelled with data as it is an application of assumption three we explained
earlier in this section. Note that the ﬁnal state of the model is state 1 in the top right part
of the ﬁgure.
Continuing with our extensions, in step 3, the probability weights must be handled
correctly in the process of reducing each component LTS to its deterministic, minimal
form. Intuitively, the elimination of a τ transition results in the merging of the transi-
tion’s target state with its source state, with the outgoing transitions of the target state
becoming outgoing transitions of the source state. Since there may be multiple τ tran-
sitions from the original source state (each with probability weight less than one), the
probability weight of an eliminated τ transition must be “pushed” to the newly accumu-
lated outgoing transitions, with the new weight on each such outgoing transition equal
to its old weight times the weight on the eliminated τ transition. In the presence of τ
self-loops (such as the τ self-loop on state 0 of Control Register in Figure 4), it can be
shown that such transitions can be eliminated entirely without any of the above merging
or pushing of its weight. At the end of the elimination of outgoing τ transitions from a
state, the weights on the outgoing transitions of the resulting state may not sum to one,
in which case the weights must be normalised so that they do sum to one.
Using the example parameters presented previously in Figure 1, the resulting min-
imised LTS for component Control is depicted in Figure 4.
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Fig.4. Minimised Component LTS for Component Control.
Finally, in step 4, the system architecture model is constructed as the parallel com-
position of the LTSs synthesized for each component. The probability weights of the
composed LTS are computed according to the notion of generative parallel composition
deﬁned by D’Argenio et al. [5]. At the end of this step, it follows that for each node of
the synthesized architecture model,
n P
j=1
PAij = 1, where n is the number of states in
the LTS architecture model and PAij is the probability of transition between state Si
and Sj of the composed LTS. Otherwise, PAij = 0 if the transition (Si,Sj) does not
exist.
The architecture model for the Boiler Control system resulting from the application
of all four steps of our extended synthesis method is depicted in Figure 5. For the sake
of readability, we present the model in textual form as a speciﬁcation expressed in FSP
(Finite State Processes), the modelling notation of the LTSA tool (Labelled TransitionSystem Analyser) [23]. FSP serves both as a modelling notation for end users, and as
an intermediate form used in the automated synthesis of LTS models. As shown in the
ﬁgure, a side-effect of the synthesis is the use of the auxiliary action endAction as the
ﬁnal action in a terminating path through the LTS.
ArchitectureModel = Q0,
Q0 = ( (0.01) control.sensor.start -> ERROR
  | (0.99) control.sensor.start -> Q1),
Q1 = ( (0.001) sensor.database.pressure -> ERROR
  | (0.999) sensor.database.pressure -> Q2),
Q2 = ( (0.001) sensor.database.pressure -> ERROR
  | (0.809) sensor.database.pressure -> Q2
  | (0.152) control.database.query -> Q3
  | (0.038) control.sensor.stop -> Q10),
Q3 = ( (0.05) database.control.data -> ERROR
  | (0.95) database.control.data -> Q4),
Q4 = ( (0.005) control.actuator.command -> ERROR
  | (0.521) control.actuator.command -> Q5
  | (0.474) sensor.database.pressure -> Q9),
Q5 = ( (0.964) sensor.database.pressure -> Q2
  | (0.036) control.sensor.stop -> Q6),
Q6 = ( (0.005) control.sensor.start -> ERROR
  | (0.005) control.sensor.shutdown -> ERROR
  | (0.495) control.sensor.start -> Q1
  | (0.495) control.sensor.shutdown -> Q7),
Q7 = ( (1.0) endAction -> Q8),
Q8 = STOP,
Q9 = ( (0.006) control.actuator.command -> ERROR
  | (0.616) control.actuator.command -> Q2
  | (0.378) sensor.database.pressure -> Q9),
Q10 = ( (0.005) control.sensor.start -> ERROR
  | (0.005) control.sensor.shutdown -> ERROR
  | (0.495) control.sensor.shutdown -> Q7
  | (0.495) control.sensor.start -> Q11),
Q11 = ( (0.855) sensor.database.pressure -> Q2
  | (0.145) control.database.query -> Q12),
Q12 = ( (0.05) database.control.data -> ERROR
  | (0.95) database.control.data -> Q13),
Q13 = ( (0.005) control.actuator.command -> ERROR
  | (0.471) control.actuator.command -> Q1
  | (0.524) sensor.database.pressure -> Q9).
Fig.5. The FSP of the Architecture Model.
3.3 Computing the Reliability Prediction
In this ﬁnal step of our prediction method, the architecture model synthesised in the
previous step is interpreted as a Markov model, and we apply the method of Cheung
to compute the reliability prediction. In particular, the transition probability weights
of the architecture model are mapped into a square transition matrix M0 whose row
entries sum to one. This is used as the matrix M0 described in Section 2.2, with N =
{E,−1,0,1,...,n − 1} the set of states in the synthesised LTS, E the terminal state of
correct execution (corresponding to state C described in Section 2.2), −1 the terminal
fault state (state F of Section 2.2), and n − 1 the state from which a transition to state
E is made upon action endAction (state Nn of Section 2.2). Note that the numeric state
labels produced by LTSA may need to be renumbered so that the state leading to state
E is the highest numbered state, as required by Cheung’s model.In Figure 6 we depict the transition matrix derived from the synthesised architecture
model presented in Figure 5; note that this is actually the reduced matrix M, with the
rows and columns for states E and −1 eliminated as in Section 2.2. Additionally, we
point out for the fact that the rows in the sparse matrix in Figure 6 will sum to one if
we add the transitions to the ERROR state. Applying the Cheung model to that matrix,
we compute the reliability prediction for the Boiler Control system as Rel= 0.649 =
64.9%.
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Fig.6. The Matrix Derived from the Synthesized Boiler LTS.
4 Implied Scenarios
Scenarios describe two aspects of a system. On the one hand, they describe a set of sys-
tem traces the system is intended to exhibit. On the other, it describes the components
that will provide system level functionality and their interfaces (the messages these
components can use to interact between each other to provide system level functional-
ity). In the example in Figure 1, we see that the Boiler Control System is expected to
exhibit a trace ”start, pressure, query, data, command ...” and that component Control
interacts with Database only through messages query and data.
It has been shown [1,25] that given a scenario speciﬁcation, it may be impossi-
ble to build a set of components that communicate exclusively through the interfaces
described and that exhibit only the speciﬁed traces when running in parallel. The addi-
tional unspeciﬁed traces that are exhibited by the composed system are all called im-
plied scenarios and are the result of specifying the behavior of a system from a global
perspective yet expecting it to be provided by independent entities with a local sys-
tem view. If the interaction mechanisms do not provide components with a rich enough
local view of what is happening at a system level, they may not be able to enforce the in-
tended system behavior. Effectively, what may occur is that each component may, from
its local perspective, believe that it is behaving correctly, yet from a system perspective
the behavior may not be what is intended.Actuator Control Database Sensor
start
pressure
query
stop
start
Fig.7. Implied Scenario Detected
The Boiler Control System of Figure 1 has implied scenarios, Figure 7 shows one of
them. From the speciﬁcation it is simple to see that after initialising Sensor there must
be some pressure data registered into the Database before any queries can be done.
However, in the implied scenario of Figure 7 a query is being performed immediately
after start.
Why is this occurring? The cause is an inadequate architecture for the traces speci-
ﬁed in the MSC speciﬁcation. The Control component cannot observe when the Sensor
hasregistereddataintheDatabase,thusifitistoquerytheDatabaseafterdatahasbeen
registered at least once, it must rely on the Database to enable and disable queries when
appropriate. However, as the Database cannot tell when the Sensor has been turned on
or off, it cannot distinguish a ﬁrst registration of data from others. Thus, it cannot enable
and disable queries appropriately. Succinctly, components do not have enough local in-
formationtopreventthesystemexecutionshowninFigure 7.Notethateachcomponent
is behaving correctly from its local point of view, i.e. it is behaving according to some
valid sequence of BMSCs. The problem is that each component is following a different
sequence of BMSCs! The Sensor, Control and Actuator are going through scenarios
Initialise, Register, Terminate, Initialise, Analysis, Register. However, the Database is
performing Initialise, Register, Analysis, Register.
Implied scenarios indicate gaps in a scenario-based speciﬁcation. They can repre-
sent intended system behaviour that was missing from the inherently partial scenario
speciﬁcation or undesired behaviour that should be avoided by changing the architec-
ture of the system. Hence, implied scenarios need to be validated (identifying them as
positive or negative system behaviour) and the scenario speciﬁcation elaborated accord-
ingly.
The existence of an implied scenario means that the reliability prediction for the
Boiler Control System described above has been applied on a scenario speciﬁcation that
has a mismatch between behaviour and architecture. The behaviour model constructed
in the previous section to predict reliability can exhibit behaviour (an implied scenairo)
that has not yet been validated and that, acording to whether it described intended or
unintended system behaviour, can impact system reliability.
As an example, suppose that the rate at which the sensor checks pressure informa-
tion and saves it in the database is high enough that the probability of occurence of the
trace in Figure 7 is negligible. Then reliability should be predicted on the behaviour
model of Figure 5 constrained in such a way that the implied scenario cannot occur. We
can use the approach described in [25] to build such a constraint.If we calculate the reliability of the resulting constrained model in the same way as
described in Section 3 then we obtain 86.2%.
On the other hand, the implied scenario may be undesired behaviour that needs to
be avoided through a change in the architecture of the system. In this case, different or
additional components will be needed, and the reliability performance will have to be
recalculated from scratch.
Either way shows that implied scenarios can impact the reliability prediction signif-
icantly and that they should be validated before reliability is calculated.
More generally, the existence of implied scenarios as a result of the close relation
that exists between behaviour and architecture in scenario-based speciﬁcations supports
our claim that taking into account behaviour and architecture when performing reliabil-
ity prediction is important.
5 Discussion and Related Work
Severalpreviousarchitecture-basedapproachestoreliabilityengineeringofcomponent-
based systems have been reported. They can be divided into two main categories, state-
based approaches and path-based approaches. Goˇ seva-Popstojanova and Trivedi pro-
vide a comprehensive survey of the various approaches [8]. For the sake of brevity, we
provide here a brief view of the approaches of greatest interest to the scope of this work.
State-based models [3,7] use a control ﬂow graph to represent the system architec-
ture. In such models it is assumed that the transfer of control among the components
can be modelled as a Markov chain, with future behaviour of the system dependent only
on the current state and not on past behaviour. Gokhale et al. use a regression test suite
to experimentally determine the architecture of the software and the reliabilities of its
components. As described in Section 2, Cheung’s model takes into account the relia-
bility of each component and the operational proﬁle. In general, relying the analysis of
the software reliability on provided state-machines may not be accurate. In our model,
the system states are generated by the LTSA based on the precision of a model checker.
Although scenarios are provided as a basis for the analysis, we explore the expressive-
ness of the given scenarios by checking if the existence of implied scenarios that could
impact negatively during the system execution.
Path-based models [20,27] compute the reliability of the system by enumerating
possible execution paths of the program. The scenario-based method of Yacoub et
al. [27] is perhaps closest in spirit to our own approach. In many ways their method
is a hybrid approach in which a state-based model of the system is constructed from a
scenariospeciﬁcation(asetofbasicscenariosplusagraphrepresentingthecomposition
of basic scenarios), and then paths through the model are enumerated until a threshold
execution time is reached along each path. Their approach reveals the pitfalls of using
imprecise, coarse-grained behaviour models of system architecture. The model used in
their approach is the component dependence graph (CDG), a state-machine model in
which the states represent execution inside a particular component (with one state per
component), and the transitions represent the transfer of control from one component
to another (with a transition from one component to another representing a merge of all
messages sent by the former to the latter in the scenarios). Because the representation ofcomponent behaviour in the CDG is at the level of whole components, it is an inherently
sequential model of system behavior in which one component executes at a time, mean-
ing that any concurrency inherent in the scenario speciﬁcation is lost. Furthermore, a
CDG can exhibit sequences of component transitions not found in the scenarios from
which it is derived. In a sense such sequences are implied scenarios, but they arise not
as an artefact of components having limited local knowledge of global behaviour. In-
stead, they are merely a consequence of modelling the system architecture imprecisely
at the granularity of whole components rather than at the granularity of the component
interactions speciﬁed in the scenarios. Finally, it can happen that a component in a CDG
is represented by an absorbing state, even though the scenario speciﬁcation itself is able
to progress beyond any interactions with the “absorbing” component. Indeed, we at-
tempted to model the Boiler Control system using the approach of Yacoub et al., with
the result that the Actuator was an absorbing component from which we had to add
transitions artiﬁcially to other components in order to construct a model that was able
to progress to the ﬁnal state.
In previous work we show how reliability engineering of component-based software
systems can be carried out following a model-driven approach [17,18]. It would be fair
to say that the Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) has had a considerable inﬂuence to
make viable model driven analysis approach such as [22], where design and analysis
of software architecture can be speciﬁed, visualized, constructed and documented us-
ing one common notation. Since its ﬁrst version, UML has been enriched in order to
become more precise syntactically and semantically. The ultimate goal is to support au-
tomated or semi-automated transformation of design models to code, raising the level
of abstraction at which automated code generation is applied. A major challenge for
model-driven development will be ﬁnding ways of enforcing or preserving properties
established early in development, particularly non-functional properties such as relia-
bility predictions.
Otherworkcanbesituatedintheareaofamodel-drivenanalysistechnique:[12,13,4].
These approaches also propose a framework for automatic generation of reliability
models from software speciﬁcations, bringing reliability analysis to early stages of the
software lifecycle. Istv´ an et al. [12,13] shed some light on ways to fully automate de-
pendabilityanalysis,appliedtotheFault-TolerantCORBA,usinggraphtransformations
into their VIATRA framework. The work from Singh et al. [21] provides a prediction al-
gorithm to analyse the reliability of the system prior to its construction. Their approach
requires the user to provide global behavior scenarios other than the local behavior of
the components interactions. However, this feature may turn out to be unsuitable for the
system modularity and therefore hindering systems maintainability.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a framework to quantitatively assess software relia-
bility using scenario speciﬁcations, thus applicable to early phases of the software life
cycle. Our major contribution lies on a reliability prediction technique that takes into
account the component structure exhibited in the scenarios and the concurrent nature of
component-based systems.In the approach we present, we have extended scenario speciﬁcation to model the
probability of component failure, and scenario transition probabilities derived from an
operational proﬁle of the system. From the extended scenario speciﬁcation, probabil-
isitic behaviour models were synthesised for each componenet and then composed in
parallel into a model for the system. The Cheung model for software reliability was
then used to compute a reliability prediction from the system behaviour model. The
importance of implied scenarios detection in the software reliability analysis was then
addressed so that the intended system behaviour could be enforced despite the local
view of the components. We numerically showed how the detection of implied scenar-
ios can improve the reliability assurance of the software system.
For future work, we will use our framework to enhance software system reliability
using software architecture models. In doing this, we can use our framework for the
purpose of model driven development to construct deployment proﬁles and generate
implementation code conﬁgured to the desired reliability assurance for software sys-
tems. Another promising direction includes the use of the synthesized component LTS
to predict component reliability. This may be useful when there are uncertainties asso-
ciated with a components operational proﬁle coming out from lack of implementation
artifacts. In Section 4 we presented initial evidence of how important is to consider im-
pliedscenarioswhenassessingprovidedscenariospeciﬁcationsforreliability.However,
additional work is needed to explore methods and techniques that can fully reveal the
effect of implied scenarios on system reliability. Finally, we plan to apply our approach
on case studies of larger, more realistic systems in order to evaluate its scalability and
the accuracy of the predictions it produces.
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